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Liability to International 




This article considers the proper method for theorizing about criminal jurisdiction. It chal-
lenges a received understanding of  how to substantiate the right to punish and articulates an 
alternative account of  how that theoretical task is properly conducted. The received view says 
that a special relationship is the ground of  a tribunal’s authority to prosecute and, hence, 
that a normative theory of  that authority is faced with identifying a distinctive relation. The 
alternative account locates prosecutorial standing on an institution’s capacity to address the 
basic reasons generating criminal liability. This reframes the normative issues at stake and 
has the result that various, perhaps quite heterogeneous, considerations can substantiate 
penal authority. It also eliminates the existence of  a special relation as a necessary condition 
for legitimate criminal accountability. The argument proceeds by offering an analysis and 
account of  universal jurisdiction. Not only does the alternative elegantly perform where the 
received view struggles, it can accommodate much of  what motivates the pursuit of  relational 
ties in existing efforts to vindicate jurisdictional conclusions.
1 Introduction
Normative theorizing about international criminal jurisdiction is caught in a certain 
picture of  authority. This picture has framed how the problematic of  the ‘right to pun-
ish’ is understood and, consequently, set the terms for the method of  justifying an 
international tribunal’s moral standing to hold an offender criminally accountable. 
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Put otherwise, it has marked the success conditions for an account of  supra-national 
criminal jurisdiction and indicated certain kinds of  questions as essential to proper 
inquiry into the matter. The picture says that standing to conduct a criminal prosecu-
tion depends fundamentally on some special relation between a defendant or a defen-
dant’s conduct and the prosecuting authority: the relation is the ground of  a tribunal’s 
right to punish a properly established offender. This (broadly speaking) Kantian view 
of  authority then erects the justificatory hurdle of  identifying some special interest, 
shared civic bond or other relational tie that could enable an international tribunal to 
legitimately prosecute international crimes. There is an alternative picture, though, 
which is roughly Razian in character. On this view, put initially, authority to punish 
is fundamentally conferred by a capacity to respond to the reasons at issue in pun-
ishment. The basis of  a tribunal’s standing, so to speak, is an institutional capacity to 
properly see to criminal liability. I will elaborate as I proceed, but the shift in perspec-
tive transforms the problematic of  the right to punish, and the method pertinent to 
morally substantiating jurisdictional claims. Moreover, the alternative vision has sig-
nificant analytical power, can capture much of  what drives the allure of  the standard 
model and can accommodate what the standard model cannot but should. Hence, if  
we are to continue on as before, we are owed more of  an answer as to why interna-
tional criminal law theory ought to proceed as it (largely) has.
I will pursue these points by offering an account of  universal jurisdiction, frequently 
understood as an especially difficult to found jurisdictional claim. By examining the 
challenges thought to beset universal jurisdiction, we can bring into relief  the back-
ground assumptions constituting the standard model of  penal authority and motivate 
the alternative picture. The resulting analysis of  universal jurisdiction, moreover, may 
be valuable in its own right, insofar as it clarifies the justificatory task initiated by a 
claim to universal jurisdiction.
2 Justifying Universal Jurisdiction
What is the nature of  a claim to universal criminal jurisdiction? How can that claim 
be vindicated? A Frenchman commits a murder on French soil against a French cit-
izen and, despite any heinousness of  the crime, we tend to think that it is a matter 
exclusively for French courts. Meanwhile, an act of  piracy involving modest coer-
cion and no harm aside from loss of  property falls, according to international law, 
squarely within the jurisdiction of  all competent judicial authorities. Despite, then, 
the fact that many of  the crimes that international lawyers are eager to include under 
the umbrella of  universal jurisdiction are heinous, ‘heinousness’ appears both insuf-
ficient and unnecessary for establishing that a crime is candidate for universal juris-
diction.1 Yet, surely a large part of  what drives the concern to classify (for instance) 
a state official’s violent and systematic attack on the populace as a universally 
1 Kontorovich, ‘The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation’, 45 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2004) 183.
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justiciable crime against humanity is a recognition that the act is a grave atrocity.2 
What is going on here?
I argue that part of  why the ‘grounds’ of  universal jurisdiction have remained elu-
sive is that we have not been adequately attentive to why and how certain kinds of  con-
siderations are pertinent. There are two oft-occurring mistakes in the international 
criminal law theory relating to jurisdiction. First, the prerogative of  certain states to 
conduct a prosecution is not fully distinguished from the criminal liability of  a defend-
ant to a particular penal institution. Second, it is assumed that a general requirement 
of  a tribunal’s legitimacy is that it establish special standing in relation to either the 
defendant or the defendant’s conduct. This standing might, for instance, be a feature 
of  an interest a tribunal has in the conduct (for example, an interest in discouraging 
atrocities from crossing borders)3 or be conferred by shared political community. In 
any case, the assumption that special standing or ground is a hurdle for prosecutorial 
legitimacy is frequently maintained independent of  any discussion of  the underlying 
normative rationales for punishment (for example, deterrence, retribution, censure, 
and so on). I argue that this is a mistake and that it occludes potential routes to sub-
stantiating universal jurisdiction.
If  the analysis is successful, it demonstrates that properly establishing universal 
jurisdiction is, in important respects, easier than some have thought. It is an error, 
for instance, to think that such jurisdiction needs to have a single, special ground, 
like ‘heinousness’ or international harm.4 The standing of  a tribunal to prosecute an 
offender depends on its ability to respond to whatever reasons generate criminal lia-
bility on the part of  the offender in the first place. These reasons may be multiple and 
heterogeneous in character and need not always pertain to the interests or relation-
ships of  those conducting the tribunal. Moreover, although a state may have a special 
prerogative to address the criminal liability of  an offender, this is a separate matter 
from the issue of  standing. A state prerogative to prosecute is a bar to universal juris-
diction, but it is a claim held by the state, not the offender. If  a tribunal convicts an 
offender with proper process and in accordance with those aspects of  an offender’s 
criminal liability that it is positioned to address, but in contravention of  a state prerog-
ative, only the state has been wronged. The convicted party has no complaint. If  there 
is no state prerogative, or it has been waived, or if  there is no relevant state to assert a 
claim, there is no one with a principled basis for rejecting a fully competent tribunal’s 
claim of  jurisdiction.
My overall aim is to consider what the claim to universal jurisdiction is comprised 
of  and, hence, what an adequate justification of  the claim involves. I proceed in two 
2 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction begin: ‘During the last century millions of  human beings 
perished as a result of  genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious crimes under 
international law. Perpetrators deserving of  prosecution have only rarely been held accountable. To stop 
this cycle of  violence and to promote justice, impunity for the commission of  serious crimes must yield 
to accountability.’ S. Macedo (ed.), The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton Principles) 
(2001), at 23.
3 L. May, Crimes against Humanity: A Normative Account (2005), at 63–95.
4 Ibid.
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stages. In the third section, I illustrate two purported hurdles to universal jurisdiction 
suggested by recent reflection on the topic. First, I exhibit the widely held assumption 
that a special ground is needed to generate legitimate juridical interest in a criminal 
offender, relying on prominent normative theories of  international criminal law (ICL). 
Second, I explicate R.A. Duff ’s articulation of  the challenge of  relational standing for 
international tribunals.5 To establish the legitimacy of  a tribunal (his thought goes), 
it is insufficient to show that it offers a high quality process and is prosecuting a crime 
under existing law. Rather, one must also demonstrate that the court has relational 
standing to prosecute the offence. As Duff  puts it, ‘[a] defendant’s challenge “By what 
right do you try me?” must be answered if  the trial is to be legitimate; the answer 
“our procedures respect the demands of  natural justice” is not an answer to that chal-
lenge’.6 A defendant’s criminal liability partly depends on whether the adjudicating 
court has the relevant moral relationship to hold the defendant accountable for the 
crimes in question. On this view, the relational standing of  domestic courts is nor-
mally grounded in a shared political community. The lack of  an international political 
community, then, threatens international tribunals with a special defect of  legitimacy. 
(Hereafter, when I speak of  ‘special standing’, I refer to both of  the above thoughts, the 
underlying idea being that even a competent tribunal must have some specific tie to a 
person to legitimately adjudicate a criminal offence.)
In the fourth section, I consider what criminal liability generally consists in, how it 
relates to the standing of  any tribunal to prosecute a criminal offence, and what this 
says about the nature of  universal jurisdiction. I  argue here that the legitimacy of  
international courts is not burdened with a general justificatory hurdle of  showing 
special standing to prosecute, so long as they respect any prerogative on the part of  
other courts. As mentioned above, I contend that liability to a penal procedure is a fea-
ture of  its capacity to respond to whatever reasons ground criminal liability in the first 
place. To answer ‘by what right do you try me?’, a court can properly answer in terms 
of  any reasons within its capacity, and, thus, it is only on a controversial understand-
ing of  what reasons can ground criminal liability that the obstacle of  special standing 
arises. More generally, the approach I develop here articulates a way of  conceiving 
penal authority that challenges a common way of  understanding the justificatory 
task posed by a jurisdictional claim. I do not seek to abandon what drives the standard 
picture outright but, rather, accommodate much of  its motivation and show that it 
supposes a narrower understanding of  the normative aims of  punishment than has 
been shown to be warranted. The account of  criminal jurisdiction I offer is capable of  
handling the variety of  aims of  the criminal law.
In the end, my aim is not so much to make the job of  ICL easier. Rather, I think the 
crucial hurdles to its rightful conduct are legitimate state interests and that we ought 
to be devoting our theoretical attention to these issues (rather than a misguided quest 
5 For purposes of  this article, ‘international courts’ includes national courts trying international crimes on 
claim of  universal jurisdiction.
6 Duff, ‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law’, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds), The 
Philosophy of  International Law (2010) 589, at 591.
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for the foundation of  universal jurisdiction). I contend that the complaints of  those 
convicted by proper criminal process of  proper international crimes, whether humble 
pirates or infamous warlords, have unhelpfully distracted international criminal law 
theory.
3 Two Assumptions Concerning the Task of  Justifying 
Universal Jurisdiction
A Assumption 1: Universal Jurisdiction Requires a Special Ground
The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction is not quite a theoretical document 
aiming to conclusively address fundamental problems facing universal jurisdiction. It 
states, rather, a kind of  consensus among a select group of  jurists and scholars about 
the appropriate aims, methods and limits of  the practice. It is all the more useful, 
though, as an embodiment of  agreement of  highly regarded thinkers. It defines the 
scope of  universal jurisdiction as follows:
When [standard grounds of  jurisdiction] and other connections are absent, national courts 
may nevertheless exercise jurisdiction under international law over crimes of  such exceptional 
gravity that they affect the fundamental interests of  the community as a whole. This is uni-
versal jurisdiction: it is jurisdiction based solely on the nature of  the crime. National courts 
can exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute and punish, and thereby deter, heinous acts 
recognized as serious crimes under international law.7
Although the meaning of  ‘jurisdiction based solely on the nature of  the crime’ might 
otherwise be uncertain, the context appears to indicate the following thought: an inter-
national crime’s possession of  the property of  heinousness (or unusual and threat-
ening gravity) warrants an otherwise unjustified jurisdictional claim. Throughout 
the document, crimes viewed as candidate for universal jurisdiction are described as 
serious, of  a heinous nature, harmful to international interests and involving gross 
violations of  human rights. Also, when the specific crimes (including piracy) are enu-
merated, they are listed under the rubric ‘Serious Crimes under International Law’.8 
This further suggests that the authors understand universal jurisdiction as requiring a 
special ground, some distinctive consideration or considerations the absence of  which 
would render a claim of  universal jurisdiction illegitimate. Such jurisdiction would 
not obtain, for instance, in the case of  ordinary domestic crimes, they not being seri-
ous or heinous enough in character to vindicate the relevant juridical interest.
In response to this sort of  thought, Eugene Kontorovich challenges what he calls 
the piracy analogy: the idea that we can expand universal jurisdiction beyond the tra-
ditional confines of  piracy on the grounds that other international crimes share with 
piracy the property of  heinousness. This analogy ought to be rejected, Kontorovich 
7 Princeton Principles, supra note 2, at 23.
8 Ibid., at 29 (emphasis added).
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contends, because piracy was not understood by international law as essentially hei-
nous in character:
[T]he rationale for piracy’s unique jurisdictional status had nothing to do with the heinous-
ness or severity of  the offense. Indeed, piracy was not regarded in earlier centuries as being 
an egregiously heinous crime, at least not in the way that most human rights offenses are 
heinous. Thus piracy could not have become universally cognizable as a result of  its perceived 
heinousness.9
The conclusion that Kontorovich draws from the failure of  the piracy analogy is that, 
as it stands, universal jurisdiction for human rights abuses and other heinous crimes 
rests on a hollow foundation. If  universal jurisdiction for piracy is not grounded on 
heinousness, piracy no longer serves as a precedent for expanding such jurisdiction to 
encompass heinous crimes. Consequently, those seeking to effect such an expansion 
need a new legal principle to render it legitimate, especially given that such a broad 
foundation could plausibly engender international conflict.10 Kontorovich’s argu-
ment appears to be primarily legal in character, as he acknowledges that there might 
be other moral warrants for universal jurisdiction: ‘Some form of  universal jurisdic-
tion may in theory be justifiable in a number of  different ways’, but his concern is 
with ‘today’s universal jurisdiction’.11 What is striking, for our purposes, is simply the 
assumption that some special justification would be required to distinguish crimes 
cognizable by universal jurisdiction from ordinary crimes that are not.12
Larry May’s much discussed approach to ICL also supposes that international tri-
bunals need a special jurisdictional ground. May has it that a state’s normal sover-
eign presumption against interference is undermined when the state inadequately 
protects subjects from threats to their basic security. Nonetheless, he asserts, even if  
a state lacks immunity from interference, we have not yet legitimated international 
prosecution:
When the security of  a person has been jeopardized … then it is permissible for sovereignty to be 
abridged so as to render the individual secure. But when we ask about international tribunals 
that hold some individuals criminally liable for the violations of  the security of  other persons, 
more needs to be shown than just that a person’s security has been breached. There must be 
some compelling reason why the international community is warranted in prosecuting indi-
viduals as opposed to States.13
May proceeds to defend the ‘international harm principle’ as the additional compelling 
reason, arguing that crimes against humanity (given their group-based character) are 
not merely local harms but also endanger humanity broadly. Hence, humanity has 
9 Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 186.
10 Ibid., at 186–210.
11 Ibid., at 236.
12 Kontorovich’s driving concern seems to be that overbroad universal jurisdiction threatens international 
order by impinging upon state sovereignty. This type of  concern is, I think, of  the right sort in thinking 
about the proper scope of  universal jurisdiction. Yet, despite my agreement on this point, I argue that 
ordinary reasons of  criminal liability may sometimes generate sufficient warrant.
13 May, supra note 3, at 81.
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a legitimate interest in prosecuting offenders who are liable in view of  this general 
threat.14
Jovana Davidovic pursues a formally similar approach that also appears to presume 
a need for a special jurisdictional ground: ‘I conclude that universal jurisdiction can 
be justified as a right of  the international community as a whole, explained by the fact 
that the type of  a wrong that arises from the international community failing to pros-
ecute a jus cogens crime is different from the wrong of  failing to prosecute such vio-
lation by some state or another (that has jurisdictional relationship to that crime).’15 
Davidovic contends that the common recognition of  jus cogens norms partly constitute 
an international community that realizes the rule of  law. Failure to prosecute viola-
tions of  these norms, then, undermines the international rule of  law, and this threat 
generates special standing for the international prosecution of  jus cogens crimes.16
I will provide one additional example.17 Jiewuh Song argues that what unites uni-
versal jurisdiction over piracy and those atrocities recognized in international law is 
that such jurisdiction serves to mitigate enforcement gaps. Piracy is not an atrocity, 
but universal jurisdiction is appropriate since traditional jurisdictional grounds leave 
the international legal prohibition on piracy inadequately enforced. Universal juris-
diction increases the chances of  capturing pirates, which then increases compliance 
with the law. Similarly, legally recognized atrocities are inadequately addressed by 
standard jurisdictional principles, especially since they are frequently conducted by 
the state, and, thus, universal jurisdiction is justified with respect to these crimes as a 
method of  filling an enforcement gap.18 Song continues:
Why, then, is universal jurisdiction permitted over some but not other norms? The natural 
answer on the enforcement gap-filling account is that universal jurisdiction norms are (i) 
norms of  international law (ii) that are prone to enforcement gaps on the typical delegated 
system of  enforcement, (iii) which are appropriately filled through judicial mechanisms impos-
ing individual legal liability. The first two components explain why torture, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and piracy become matters of  legal concern for foreign states 
with no territorial or geographic ties.19
Slightly differently, an essential part of  the reason why legal institutions unrelated 
to offenders can prosecute them is because the offenders violate recognized norms 
of  international law. Absent this, the assertion is, we would leave something unex-
plained about the justification of  universal jurisdiction – that is, shared positive law is 
14 Ibid., at 63–95.
15 Davidovic, ‘Universal Jurisdiction and International Criminal Law’, in C. Flanders and Z. Hoskins (eds), 
The New Philosophy of  Criminal Law (2016) 113, at 124.
16 Ibid., at 123–127.
17 Though more could be enumerated. See, e.g., David Luban’s approach to crimes against humanity. 
Luban, ‘A Theory of  Crimes against Humanity’, 29 Yale Journal of  International Law (2004) 85. See 
also Lee, ‘International Crimes and Universal Jurisdiction’, in L. May and Z. Hoskins (eds), International 
Criminal Law and Philosophy (2010) 15.
18 Song, ‘Pirates and Torturers: Universal Jurisdiction as Enforcement Gap-Filling’, 23 Journal of  Political 
Philosophy (2015) 471, at 481–484.
19 Ibid., at 485.
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a crucial ground for universal jurisdiction.20 Common to all these approaches, then, 
is the idea that a special ground concerning the nature of  the crime, the crime’s effect 
on international interests, or the crime’s common recognition, is necessary both to 
demonstrate a legitimate juridical concern as a matter of  universal jurisdiction and to 
determine the proper scope of  that concern.
B Assumption 2: Relational Standing a General Prerequisite of  
Criminal Liability
On Duff ’s view, criminal liability requires not merely failing with respect to a stand-
ard or reasons (that is, not doing what one is responsible for doing) but failing where 
one is responsible to somebody for meeting the standard or responding to the reasons. 
Liability to penal sanction is conditional upon both a criminal wrong and the exist-
ence of  a party to which an agent is responsible for avoiding the wrong so that this 
party, consequently, has standing to hold the agent to account. The dependence of  
answerability on relational standing is, Duff  argues, a familiar feature of  our moral 
lives. If  I am unkind to my aunt, she or my family can rightly hold me to account, but 
not a stranger on the bus. I am not responsible to the stranger, and, to her criticism of  
my insensitivity, I can reply that it is none of  her business. Likewise, infidelity on the 
part of  a committed partner does not confer a right on an uninvolved neighbour to 
hold the partner to account, and a teacher’s neglect of  his pedagogy invites accounta-
bility from students and colleagues but not from his aunt. These cases illustrate, Duff  
contends, that one’s answerability for wrongdoing depends on one’s relationship 
to the person or body doing the accounting. For crimes, the relevant relationship is 
one of  common citizenship – the political community has standing to hold citizens 
accountable for wrongs that are the public’s concern: ‘[W]e are criminally responsible 
as citizens, under laws that are our laws; which implies that we are criminally respon-
sible to our fellow citizens collectively.’21
Why not think that criminal responsibility for moral wrongs attaches to us simply 
as moral agents? First, it would render all types of  moral wrongdoing candidate for 
criminalization. Cruelly ending a sexual relationship may be morally wrong, but it is 
not an activity of  proper concern to the criminal law. Our ability to talk of  criminal 
law’s ‘proper concern’, for Duff, is a feature of  criminal liability’s relational character. 
I am responsible for some things to my political community as a citizen, and it is only 
for these things that I can be criminally responsible. For other activities of  no legiti-
mate public concern, however wrongful, I cannot acquire criminal liability.22
Duff ’s second objection is that treating wrongdoing by moral agents, as such, as a 
sufficient ground of  criminal liability over-includes who can criminalize:
20 A point she emphasizes. See ibid., at 487.
21 Duff, ‘Answering for Crime’, 106 Proceedings of  the Aristotelian Society (2005) 87, at 94 (emphasis in 
original).
22 Ibid., at 88–101. Here Duff  requires, as he acknowledges, a substantive account of  what makes for public 
wrongs, but the claim of  interest to us here is simply that there are such wrongs.
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[I]t implies that there is reason to make it a crime under English law for a German to steal from 
a fellow German in Germany: a sensible division of  labour might favour a system of  national 
courts operating with more limited jurisdictions, but if  the aim is that wrongdoers be punished 
as they deserve, this seems to give any legislature reason to criminalise any kind of  wrongdoing 
anywhere in the world. Surely, however, the German thief  could rightly claim that his admit-
tedly wrongful theft is simply not the business of  the English legal system.23
Duff  emphasizes the point in rejecting David Luban’s contention that international 
tribunals acquire their legitimacy through the quality of  justice they deliver. On 
Luban’s account, what is crucial to the legitimacy of  international courts policing 
the activities of  sovereign states is not any prior authorization (treaty or otherwise) 
but, rather, ‘the manifested fairness of  their procedures and punishments’.24 Fairness, 
Luban argues, provides a non-arbitrary basis for a tribunal’s jurisdiction over interna-
tional crimes. The reason we rightly prefer an international tribunal, compared to (for 
instance) the World Chess Federation or the Kansas City dogcatcher, to carry out the 
prosecution of  international crimes is the fact (where it obtains) of  a tribunal’s pro-
vision of  adequate process and fair treatment. As Luban puts it, a tribunal can ‘boot-
strap’ itself  into legitimacy by delivering what natural justice requires.25 In response, 
Duff  notes that a Polish thief ’s theft against a Polish citizen on Polish territory is, in 
principle, not an English crime or justiciable in an English court and is so irrespec-
tive of  the quality of  English proceedings: ‘A court’s procedures might be impeccable; 
the defendant might be guilty of  wrongdoing that merits condemnation and punish-
ment: but unless this court can claim jurisdiction over him, it cannot legitimately try 
him.’26 Slightly differently, a defendant can resist criminal liability by challenging a 
court’s relational standing, and pointing to fairness is not the right kind of  answer to 
a defendant’s challenge. Rather, we must answer in terms of  a relevant relationship. 
Domestically, we can address the challenge in terms of  shared political community. 
Internationally, we might point to delegated jurisdiction consequent of, say, a treaty 
(we can try you because your political community authorized us). For claims of  uni-
versal jurisdiction, however, we need an account of  a relationship that could ground 
standing to prosecute. Absent a relationship grounding standing, an international tri-
bunal is illegitimate.27
23 Ibid., at 93.
24 Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of  International Criminal Law’, 
in Besson and Tasioulas, supra note 6, 569, at 579.
25 Ibid., at 569–588.
26 Duff, ‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law’, in Besson and Tasioulas, supra note 6, 
589, at 591.
27 Ibid., at 589–604. Duff  gestures at the notion of  humanity as a moral community as one potential solu-
tion to the problem of  standing for universal jurisdiction, noting that community is frequently more aspi-
ration than achieved social fact. I discuss this below. Other thinkers who accept Duff ’s hurdle to universal 
jurisdiction include Renzo, ‘Crimes against Humanity and the Limits of  International Criminal Law’, 
31 Law and Philosophy (2012) 443; Wallerstein, ‘Delegation of  Powers and Authority in International 
Criminal Law’, 9 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2015) 123; Davidovic, supra note 15.
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4 Criminal Jurisdiction: Liability and State Prerogative
I will begin by critically examining Duff ’s understanding of  the preconditions of  a 
right to punish and then connect the resulting analysis of  universal jurisdiction to the 
assumption that such jurisdiction requires a special ground. Duff  employs powerful 
intuitions to support a sophisticated and interesting view, but they do not establish the 
general dependence of  criminal liability on relational standing. I will state the point 
roughly first and then more rigorously. It strikes me as odd that someone correctly 
convicted of  a proper crime (that is, a crime that is legally established and ought to 
be legally established – for instance, murder) is wronged when he is penalized pro-
portionate to his offence by capable and fair institutions, by virtue of  the fact that the 
institutions bear no special relationship to him. Or, at least, that he is wronged to the 
degree of  someone who is convicted and punished by unfair and incompetent proce-
dures. But, this is what Duff ’s position implies. In treating both criminal wrongdoing 
(suitably established) and answerability to as threshold conditions of  criminal liability, 
the complaint against punishment of  the murderer convicted in the wrong jurisdic-
tion is on par with that of  someone wrongly convicted by inadequate process. The 
complaints would appeal to different conditions, but both would establish (if  Duff  is 
correct) an identical lack of  criminal liability. This strikes me as absurd, but it may not 
as forcefully for everyone, so let us think through the point.
At minimum, to suffer criminal liability is to have a moral status, such that one is 
eligible for penal treatment, treatment that would otherwise be wrongful. Punishing 
someone for a crime she clearly did not commit (seriously) wrongs her since our nor-
mal moral status as persons bars punishment. Criminal liability, then, is acquired as 
a departure from a moral status quo forbidding punishment, and it attaches to a per-
son, differentiating her from others who retain moral immunity to penal treatment. 
Others retaining the initial moral status have standing to complain of  a wrong when 
subjected to punishment, whereas the criminally liable does not so long as punish-
ment does not exceed the extent of  the liability. Criminal liabilities could be relational, 
where the departure from the moral status quo is only in reference to certain bodies 
or persons. To know, we have to ask what criminal liability is a function of  – in vir-
tue of  what is a person rendered liable to penal treatment? To answer this question 
is to enter familiar debates about the justification of  punishment: retribution, deter-
rence, expression, rehabilitation, censure, some combination of  these and so on. The 
account of  justified punishment will identify some features of  a situation or person or 
choice or act whose moral salience generates a change in the moral status of  a person 
to one of  criminal liability.28 These features are reasons for criminal liability – they are 
reasons for disabling the otherwise able complaint against penal treatment. A success-
ful theory of  punishment will identify these reasons and show them to be sufficient to 
establish criminal liability.
28 At least, an account of  punishment will be interested in doing this so far as it is concerned to legitimate 
the punishment of  the guilty, specifically.
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Now consider Duff ’s substantive theory of  punishment and its bearing on his 
generic claims about criminal accountability. Duff ’s substantive theory has it that 
state punishment is justified as a communicative disavowal of  an offender’s neglect 
of  reasons she is responsible for (that is, her crime) by those to whom the agent is 
responsible (that is, fellow citizens) in order to bring about a restoration of  the norma-
tive relationship between the offender and his fellow citizens ruptured by the crimi-
nal act:29 ‘[O]ffenders should suffer retribution, punishment, for their crimes: but the 
essential purpose of  such punishment should be to achieve restoration.’30 Relational 
standing is critical, on this view, because of  the special reasons that are thought to 
ground criminal liability: they are reasons to restore a relationship, and, as such, only 
parties to the relationship can appropriately respond to them, in much the same way 
that a friend alone could accept a relationship-restoring apology for a misdeed that 
damaged a friendship. On this theory, the crime initiates criminal liability (the offender 
deserves punishment because of  the wrong), but, again, this is because the function of  
punishment is to restore a relationship the crime breaches. Punishment is thereby the 
province of  a political community. Without a relevant community, punishment has 
no legitimate purpose (we have no reasons for criminal liability), and, hence, there can 
be no criminal liability. We have just stated a version of  the idea that special relational 
standing is a condition of  criminal liability.
The central point is that relational standing is not a general problematic for crim-
inal liability but only a hurdle for a view that treats the basic reasons for criminal 
liability as primarily or exclusively relationship dependent.31 Consider this by con-
trasting Duff ’s theory with those that justify punishment in terms of, for instance, 
classical retributivism, deterrence or norm expression. On these sorts of  accounts, 
the reasons for criminal liability are relationship independent, and, hence, special, 
relational standing cannot appear as a lacuna arising between criminal wrong and 
criminal liability. For instance, if  deterrence sometimes justifies criminal liability, then 
what is required from the view of  such liability is the capacity to introduce the rel-
evant incentives. Or, if  norm-expression sometimes justifies criminal liability, then 
(roughly) what is required from the view of  such liability is the capacity to properly 
articulate the message to those who should hear it. Relational standing, then, only 
performs as a theoretical hurdle on a sectarian view of  the moral reasons for criminal 
liability. In fact, insofar as it is intuitively clear that procedurally sound international 
courts can sometimes try defendants for crimes (in absence of  ties of  community) 
without thereby wronging them, we have some evidence that a relational theory of  
punishment like Duff ’s is not the whole story of  criminal liability. (I enumerate some 
29 R. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (2000).
30 Duff, ‘Restorative Punishment and Punitive Restoration’, in Lode Walgrave (ed.), Restorative Justice and the 
Law (2002) 82.
31 Call reasons for criminal liability ‘relationship dependent’ when they are reasons for accomplishing a 
change in a relationship; normally, the relationship modification can only be brought about by parties to 
the relationship.
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problematic examples for Duff  shortly.) Duff ’s approach does not necessarily serve to 
rebut such an intuition, but is potentially threatened by it.
Here is a general thesis (call it ‘reason dependence of  standing’ [RDS]): a tribunal’s 
standing to prosecute and penalize a defendant is a feature of  its ability to respond to 
reasons for criminal liability. Liability to prosecution obtains to the extent that there 
are reasons for criminal liability with respect to the purported act,32 the defendant 
ought to have been aware that the behaviour invited criminal liability and somebody 
can properly respond to those reasons and exploit the liability.33 Normally, whatever 
the character of  the reasons, the last condition will require adequate and fair pro-
cess since, at the very least, it will be crucial to establish the propriety and suitable 
character of  penal treatment. According to RDS, if  all reasons for criminal liability 
were relationship dependent, then we would face the justificatory burden of  establish-
ing a relevant relationship since proper responsiveness would require being party to 
it. Hence, the thesis captures why relational standing appears as a special obstacle 
to ICL on Duff ’s theory. Moreover, it articulates a plausible conclusion as a corollary 
of  the above analysis. If  a procedure can correctly serve the reasons for burdening 
one’s moral status with criminal liability in the first place, there is no credible objec-
tion a criminal wrongdoer can raise against prosecution. We might doubt that there 
are reasons for criminal liability at all, but this would amount to something close to 
general abolitionism.34 It would not raise a special challenge of  standing. We might 
also assert a special prerogative on the part of  certain persons or institutions to carry 
out the penal process. A  variety of  moral considerations could be adduced to sub-
stantiate such a claim: self-determination, the interests of  a political community in 
maintaining juridical order (that is, potentially the same sorts of  considerations that 
forbid vigilantism), the interest in victims having access to the proceedings, a state’s 
interest in demonstrating its commitment to certain values. All of  these, and there 
could be others, seem plausible,35 but none generate a claim on behalf  of  the offender. 
If  a tribunal intrudes without the warrant of  institutions that have a prerogative, it is 
32 And where the reasons for liability are sufficient to establish criminal liability. I am grateful to Mattias 
Iser for urging this clarification. Also, I assume here that any procedure with standing does not violate 
individual rights (e.g., by engaging in torture to coerce a confession).
33 The thesis bears some similarity to Luban’s claim, described above, that international tribunals can attain 
rightness through their fairness. However, it is a more general claim about adjudicative standing that is 
suggested by the preceding analysis. Moreover, it explains why courts can, sometimes, answer the ques-
tion ‘By what right do you try me?’ with the answer ‘Because our procedures are fair’. Procedural fair-
ness will be part of  the story of  why a tribunal is capable of  appropriately responding to the reasons for 
criminal liability. Slightly differently, my diagnosis of  why it seems obvious to Luban that international 
tribunals can bootstrap themselves into legitimacy by respecting natural justice is that he considers the 
norm expression that a proper public trial accomplishes as competently responding to some reasons for 
criminal liability, reasons that do not depend on the kind of  relationships of  concern to Duff.
34 ‘Close’ because it depends on how we understand a deterrence theory that does not indicate special liabil-
ities but only says deterrence-effecting punishment is justified, and the (normal) preference for the guilty 
is merely a function of  what (normally) happens to deter criminal acts in a world like ours.
35 And such considerations could be used to justify the practice of  complementarity in international crimi-
nal law.
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those institutions that are wronged, not the offender. The prerogative is not a feature 
of  the offender’s liability. An offender could reasonably complain that there is a more 
capable institution that can feasibly conduct the prosecution. This would, though, be 
to articulate an objection premised upon RDS. Moreover, it is not an objection that 
would categorically disfavour international tribunals – it would depend on the relative 
capacity of  the institutions in question.
It is worth emphasizing that state institutions will sometimes have powerful moral 
prerogatives to control how and whether a defendant is prosecuted and so consistent 
with RDS. For instance, there are significant reasons in some contexts for domestic 
institutions being capable of  offering amnesty for international crimes. Such a power 
can, for example, put the state in a position to negotiate a peace settlement in the midst 
of  civil strife.36 Yet, again, this is not to speak to the offender’s liability to international 
prosecution; it is, rather, to speak to the rights of  domestic authorities. If  international 
law fails to accord domestic authorities such a power, and those institutions deserve 
it, it is not the offenders who can complain but, rather, the authorities and their con-
stituents. Somewhat differently, treating relational standing as a general justificatory 
hurdle has the potential to convolute our concern with the legitimacy of  international 
courts. If  what motivates allegiance to the idea of  special standing as a condition of  
criminal liability is a concern for domestic institutions’ ability to see to proper state 
interests free of  interference, then our insistence on relational standing as a condition 
of  the criminal liability will encourage us to have the wrong conversation. What may 
sometimes concern us is whether the prosecutorial purview of  international criminal 
law burdens the legitimate exercise of  domestic institutional functions. If  so, then the 
conversation ought to centre on the scope of  those functions rather than on the crim-
inal liability (as such) of  the offender.
The general significance of  RDS for liability to prosecution by international tribu-
nals is, in one sense, unsurprising. Criminal liability will largely depend on how far 
justificatory theories of  punishment successfully show there are reasons for crimi-
nal liability that obtain, and can be responded to, in an international context. More 
plainly, we need answers to the questions: what are the moral purposes of  criminal 
prosecution and how far does international prosecution serve these purposes? Yet RDS 
clarifies the nature of  a claim of  universal jurisdiction. The claim properly says: the 
capacity to be reason responsive to some important reasons for criminal liability is not 
jurisdictionally dependent with respect to the matter in question, and a special prerog-
ative does not obtain.37 Relatedly, RDS disaggregates the roles of  special jurisdictional 
claims: they function either to indicate a distinctive capacity or to assert a preroga-
tive. Once we have shown that an international tribunal is procedurally fair and non-
intrusive upon another’s prerogative, we do not then face a further justificatory task 
of  establishing relational standing, unless the dominant reasons for criminal liability 
36 For discussion of  domestic amnesties and ICL, see Pensky, ‘Amnesty on Trial: Impunity, Accountability, 
and the Norms of  International Law’, 1 Ethics and Global Politics (2008) 1.
37 Or, more precisely, does not obtain to a degree that rebuts the reasons we have for exploiting the criminal 
liability.
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require it. Duff  claims that the ‘legitimacy of  [the criminal trial] depends both on its 
procedural fairness, and on the court’s authority to call the defendant to answer; a 
deficiency in one of  these dimensions cannot be compensated by adequacy, or even by 
perfection, in the other’.38 Only on the controversial view that relationship-dependent 
reasons are the only reasons for criminal liability are we warranted in treating these 
elements of  a tribunal’s legitimacy as entirely heterogeneous. Insofar as we have other 
significant reasons for criminal liability operative in an international context, we can 
justifiably relax our concern with a suspect’s question of  ‘By what right do you try 
me?’ So long as no prerogative is contravened, an international trial will act permis-
sibly if  it is capably seeing to these reasons. This is just to say that the trial is legitimate.
To notice the broader importance of  the clarification here, consider first Massimo 
Renzo’s theory of  crimes against humanity. Renzo contends that we must address both 
a conceptual question of  what a crime against humanity is and a normative question 
of  what justifies international prosecution: ‘[W]hy does the international community 
have the right to prosecute and punish crimes against humanity?’39 The ensuing dis-
cussion makes clear that by ‘right to prosecute’ Renzo means not merely the ability 
to sometimes overcome a normal state prerogative (though, he means this too) but 
also standing to address criminal liability at all. Consequently, he invests considera-
ble theoretical labour into showing that crimes against humanity deny victims their 
human status in a way that grounds a legitimate interest in prosecution on the part of  
humanity as a whole. Renzo does adopt Duff ’s relational view of  criminal accounta-
bility, but he does so ‘in order to explain why the international community has a right 
to punish crimes against humanity’.40 Rather than seeing relational standing as a spe-
cial justificatory burden generated by his assumptions about criminal responsibility, 
he uses a particular view of  criminal responsibility as a solution to a general theoret- 
ical problem. But, there is no such problem. Renzo’s discussion is still interesting and 
worthwhile, but as a denominational one. Slightly differently, it is important for us 
to be clear in our theorizing that a commitment to a substantive theory of  relational 
accountability generates the hurdle of  relational standing – it is not an independent 
problem that relational accountability could be a solution to.
Consider next the earlier described assumption that universal jurisdiction requires 
a special ground (for example, heinousness or international harm). As I hope is now 
apparent, this assumption is unwarranted. A  tribunal can have standing merely 
by virtue of  being capable of  responding to ordinary reasons of  criminal liability. 
Universal jurisdiction does not require special considerations. To illustrate, May’s dis-
cussion of  the special harm of  crimes against humanity is interesting in its own right, 
but treating such harm as a precondition of  legitimate prosecution again supposes 
that there is a general theoretical task of  establishing special standing, rather than 
one specific to particular views of  the justification of  punishment. If  local reasons 
for criminal liability can be served by a non-local procedure, then an offender is in no 
38 Duff, supra note 26, at 592.
39 Renzo, supra note 27, at 448.
40 Ibid., at 454 (emphasis added).
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position to complain from view of  her liability. What will normally be at issue in claims 
of  universal jurisdiction is whether some specific institution has a prerogative. Slightly 
differently, the kinds of  interests (for example, international harm) to which many of  
the theorists above appealed could simply operate at the level of  either justifying a pro 
tanto claim on the part of  international institutions to prosecute or disabling other-
wise competent state prerogatives to control an offender’s treatment. The alternative 
picture of  penal authority defended here helps us effectively direct our justificatory 
efforts. The general framework first identifies potential penal authorities by their insti-
tutional capacity to respond to important reasons of  criminal liability – and, here, 
we must certainly attend to what kinds of  reasons are at issue and to the differential 
capacity among institutions. This is the question of  to whom an offender is criminally 
liable. We then, as a separate inquiry, consider who has a special claim (or, among 
claimants, who has the strongest claim) to control the prosecution. This is the ques-
tion of  the claim right to prosecutorial control.41
We should welcome this analytical result, at least insofar as we are confident that 
piracy is rightly a matter of  universal jurisdiction. We do not have to characterize, 
implausibly, piracy as a special sort of  crime. Rather, piracy can be understood in 
pedestrian terms as a kind of  brigandry, a property crime on the scale of  armed rob-
bery, not genocide. It generates ordinary criminal liability, but no state claims any spe-
cial prerogative, and, hence, the crime is candidate for consideration in any competent 
court. Further, it explains how privateers, who often engaged in qualitatively similar 
behaviour, could be thought not subject to universal jurisdiction.42 Despite the simi-
larity of  their conduct, states could be understood to have a legitimate interest in con-
trolling privateering licences and behaviour, and (perhaps) in their privateers’ welfare. 
(This is not to endorse those as legitimate state prerogatives, but just to note how a 
differentiation in terms of  jurisdiction was conceptually available.)
Perhaps Duff  is correct, though, in characterizing all reasons for criminal liability 
as relationship dependent in his substantive theory of  punishment. Indeed, I have not 
quite refuted the idea, and I am not interested in showing that all reasons for criminal 
liability are relationship independent. Nonetheless, the challenge I began this section 
with has some force here. If  all important reasons for criminal liability are relationship 
dependent, then an offender suitably convicted of  a proper crime in the wrong juris-
diction can rightly complain against his punishment with the same force as someone 
convicted by unfair procedures. The oddness of  positing such a parity is explained if  
we grant that there are some significant relationship-independent reasons ground-
ing criminal liability. Without denying that there may be some relationship-dependent 
reasons that only a murderer’s (for example) political community can address, we 
can acknowledge that there are other respects in which the extra-national tribunal 
41 As partly indicated earlier, complementarity is easily accounted for on this model. A state may have a 
defeasible prerogative, but not one that resists whatever reasons extra-national actors have for seeing 
the prosecution competently conducted at all. Hence, if  the state is unwilling, the International Criminal 
Court (for example) can permissibly get involved.
42 For a discussion of  privateers and international law, see Kontorovich, supra note 1.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-abstract/28/4/1047/4866306
by Binghamton University user
on 16 February 2018
1062 EJIL 28 (2017), 1047–1067
is competent. Moreover, Duff ’s view (as comprehensive account of  criminal liability) 
faces further challenges. If  Duff  were wholly correct, piracy would not (as just noted) 
be candidate for universal jurisdiction, and we would be ill-placed to justify a histor-
ically core crime of  international criminal law. Also, as Alejandro Chehtman points 
out, Duff  cannot account for the principle of  objective territoriality, which grants a 
state jurisdiction over a non-national offender when the result of  the conduct per-
formed abroad occurs on the state’s territory (for example, A shoots B across a national 
border). Similarly, Duff  cannot ground an affected state’s jurisdiction over counter-
feiting and Internet fraud conducted by aliens abroad or terrorist activity involving 
non-nationals.43 Chehtman’s cases are not matters of  universal jurisdiction, but the 
point is that in these cases legitimate state interests seem sufficient for generating a 
prerogative to prosecute despite a lack of  a civic relational bond. This could only be so 
if  punishment were permissible, and, thus, only if  at least some reasons for criminal 
liability are relationship independent.
Duff  could respond by biting some bullets or by thinly defining the relevant moral 
relationship (at least for a broad array of  crimes) in terms of  shared humanity.44 The 
problem with the first avenue is that Duff  is not arguing from an Archimedean point 
but, rather, from a set of  intuitions that are vulnerable to competing judgments. The 
above jurisdictional rules are legally entrenched and, prima facie, intuitively accept-
able. The more we are asked to set them aside to accommodate the relationship de-
pendence of  all reasons of  criminal liability, the more we should question the thesis’s 
credibility. Further, the force of  the core intuition that the German thief  is not the 
business of  English courts is somewhat ambiguous once we have the proper distinc-
tions in hand. Is our judgment here really (entirely) about the criminal liability of  the 
thief  or is it (at least partly) about the prerogative of  German courts? After all, the 
Dutch pirate’s threat to Spanish vessels is very much the business of  English courts (at 
least, per international law).
The second avenue of  defining a moral relationship broader than political com-
munity is also problematic. We can put a main worry in terms of  a dilemma. The thin-
ner the relationship (for example, shared humanity), the less the idea of  relational 
responsibility seems to do any work. I am responsible to anyone who could conceiva-
bly hold me to account, and I am accountable for a broad host of  crimes – for instance, 
theft, murder, fraud and so on. This consequence is surely in tension with some of  
the basic motivations for relational responsibility. On the other hand, the thicker the 
moral relationship posited for criminal answerability, the more offenders it will in prin-
ciple exclude and, consequently, the more the theory will be forced to bite the above 
sorts of  bullets.45
43 A. Chehtman, The Philosophical Foundations of  Extraterritorial Punishment (2010), at 84–85.
44 Duff, supra note 26, at 599–604. For a similar strategy, see Renzo, supra note 27.
45 For similar points, see Chehtman, supra note 43, at 125–128. It is worth mentioning that Davidovic 
attempts a middle course by defining the fact of  the international community in terms of  its actual ac-
ceptance of  jus cogens norms. This community, on her account, has relational standing with respect to 
these norms. Davidovic, supra note 15. This is a nice move, but the approach faces some jurisdictional 
bullet biting for non-jus cogens crimes.
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And rather than trying to make it all or none, why not think that there are a plu-
rality of  reasons accounting for criminal liability? It could be the case that an inter-
national tribunal can respond to some, but not all, reasons for criminal liability, and 
this may affect the character of  the liabilities the penal process can justifiably exploit. 
If  part of  punishment’s point is to bring about a reparative apology on the part of  the 
offender, then those aspects of  penalization solely related to this purpose are likely not 
within the capacity of  the international court to effect. We need not treat the domes-
tic and international trial as wholly isomorphic moral endeavours. To illustrate, con-
sider the kind of  everyday scenarios Duff  draws upon. I (counterfactually) am rude 
to my aunt on the airplane. I belittle her, deny her basic courtesies, refuse to help her 
load her overhead luggage, ignore her requests and her conversation, do not see to 
her comfort – all in ways that are evident and evidently unjustified to unrelated pas-
sengers and crew. As a consequence, someone sitting adjacent tells me that the way 
I am treating my aunt is ‘not cool’, the couple behind glowers in my direction and the 
flight attendant is short with me and perhaps skimps on my beverage service. Were 
I behaving decently, I could reasonably complain of, or justifiably resent, such treat-
ment. They would be minor mistreatments, but I deserve to be treated with respect, 
as a responsible moral agent. As it stands, my public abuse of  my aunt compromises 
my ability to forcefully complain to, or justifiably resent, these strangers – I am liable, 
so to speak. Of  course, I am liable to much more from my aunt, she can (for example) 
permissibly disinvite me to a family holiday she hosts, chastise me in strong terms, 
convey my maltreatment to my cousins. Moreover, we could plausibly construe these 
special liabilities as having relationship-restoring functions. She can, in ways strang-
ers cannot, respond to the reasons for restoring our relationship that my mistreatment 
breached. If  unrelated others were to attempt to hold me to account in similar ways, 
I could plausibly complain that it is none of  their business. My neighbour’s criticism of  
my rudeness, however, does not appear equally vulnerable to such rebuttal.
Consider also why we might worry about unrelated others exploiting acquired lia-
bilities. In general, we do not want diffuse neighbourhood accountability practices for 
marital infidelities or (at least some range of) child-rearing differences. Neighbours 
are typically epistemically ill-suited to assess the degree or nature of  the wrong and its 
accompanying liability. There will be no reliable shared sense of  how much the liabil-
ity has been exploited and, thus, a tendency to over-account. The motivations behind 
much neighbour interest are untrustworthy in their care for any actual reasons for 
liability (for example, such concern could be prurient or busy-body and tending more 
to salacious delight or self-satisfaction than achieving a reasonable response). Here 
jurisdictional claims function not only to assert relationship-dependent reasons for 
liability (though, they probably do that too) but also to police response to relationship-
independent reasons to capable respondents. The upshot for an institutional context is 
that we might account for our sense of  what counts as a public versus private liability 
not only in terms of  relationship dependence but also in terms of  capacity to address 
the character of  the liability.
The point in the above two paragraphs is narrow. Duff  has developed an illuminat-
ing and sophisticated account of  many of  our penal practices, and I have no interest 
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here in comprehensively refuting him. Rather, the argument is merely that it is not the 
whole story of  criminal liability and that we can see international tribunals carrying 
out other parts of  that story. Additionally, if  this is right, then we need an account of  
penal authority capacious enough to tell all of  these stories, and the reason-based 
account described above is up to that task. It can tell us why relationships sometimes 
matter to criminal accountability and why sometimes they do not.
Even if  these points are granted with respect to positions like Duff ’s, one might still 
worry that I have neglected the view that there is (contra John Locke) no natural right 
to punish. Elizabeth Anscombe, for instance, denies that there is a private right to pun-
ish in the state of  nature that can be transferred to civil authority, asserting that ‘civil 
society is the bearer of  rights of  coercion not possibly existent among men without 
government’.46 She grants that there may be natural rights to self-defence but that this 
does not justify, she contends, more ambitious coercive interference aimed at retribu-
tion or deterrence. Absent a state, a punished wrongdoer could reasonably complain 
that the private party had no right to deliver her just deserts or to make use of  her 
in the party’s project of  deterrence.47 This view suggests that a political relationship 
could be required by all theories of  punishment, not merely those that are furthering 
some purpose specific to a relationship.48
One response here would be to challenge the claim that principles of  self-defence 
and related norms of  interpersonal morality cannot ground the prospective, protec-
tive functions of  state punishment.49 However, to sustain the general picture of  pros-
ecutorial authority that I advocate here, we should instead seek clarity about what 
it is to deny a natural right to punishment, and Anscombe’s defence of  the denial is 
helpful. Anscombe maintains that the ultimate justification for penal practices is the 
need to protect people. Locke’s contention that there exists a private right of  punish-
ing wrongdoers is mistaken, she argues, because those seeking justice and enacting 
punishment in the absence of  a state will be acting on their own biased judgment of  
when and how much punishment is warranted. Similarly motivated others are likely 
to disagree with that judgment in such a circumstance and, hence, will retaliate in 
the interest of  doing justice: ‘And so instead of  procuring a peaceful normality, such a 
principle [that there is a private right of  punishment] would promote a general war-
fare within which even the quietest … could hardly hope to go safely. Hence I denied 
that right of  punishment.’50
On Anscombe’s account, then, it is precisely because private parties would under-
mine the aim of  punishment (‘protection of  the people’) that they are not authorized 
to engage in it. The state can have rights of  punishment not possessed by individuals in 
the state of  nature not because of  some moral alchemy involved in moving to collective 
authority but, rather, in virtue of  its distinctive capacity to respond to the reasons for 
46 Anscombe, ‘On the Source of  the Authority of  the State’, 20 Ratio (1978) 1, at 19.
47 Ibid.
48 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this issue.
49 See V. Tadros, The Ends of  Harm: The Moral Foundations of  Criminal Law (2011).
50 Anscombe, supra note 46, at 21.
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punishment. If  this is what is intended by the denial of  a natural right to punish, then 
the theory of  penal authority I advocate, which makes institutional capacity central to 
standing, is well suited to understand it – it is essentially an assertion concerning what 
reasons there are for punishment and what agents can respond to them. Moreover, we 
could even grant some of  Anscombe’s substantive claims on these matters and expect 
public, impartial and well-ordered institutions to sometimes have a right to punish 
non-nationals in virtue of  those institutions’ capacity to genuinely provide protection.
On the other hand, if  the claim is that the state makes a moral difference because 
it constitutes a relationship between persons absent in the state of  nature, and that 
relationship is the sole basis of  penal authority, then we are essentially affirming a ver-
sion of  Duff ’s relationship dependence of  standing thesis. To this, we should say all 
the things said already: that the view that there are only relationship-dependent rea-
sons for criminal liability is inadequately motivated, that it delivers a strange parity in 
the moral complaints of  non-national wrongdoers and those wrongly convicted with-
out process, that it cannot handle the standard case of  universal jurisdiction (piracy) 
and that it cannot accommodate certain other principles of  jurisdiction recognized by 
international law. In sum, two promising ways of  understanding the denial of  a nat-
ural right to punish (that avoids entailing abolitionism) is that it asserts either a dis-
tinctive capacity on the part of  certain institutions to see to the ends of  punishment or 
the dependence of  all penal authority on relational facts that only obtain between an 
individual and her state. The first (accurate or not) does not challenge my account, and 
the second we have good reason to reject. There could be other possible interpretations, 
I suppose, but they would have to tell a plausible alternative story about how the state 
could have moral powers that individuals in the state of  nature do not – that is, how 
the state can make a basic moral difference in terms of  how we can treat each other.
I should also say that it is not my position that the entire body of  thought concern-
ing the right to punish has been deluded about its justificatory task. Given the sophis-
tication and extent of  that theory, such a position is prima facie untenable. Rather, 
I have attempted to illustrate why the standard picture has seemed attractive, despite 
its error. Also, some have implicitly accorded with the approach I describe here. For 
example, Chehtman’s sophisticated approach to criminal jurisdiction recognizes the 
tight connection between a substantive theory of  penal practices and jurisdictional 
boundaries. The jurisdictional conclusions he arrives at are explicitly grounded in his 
interest-based theory of  punishment.51 To take another instance, Andrew Altman 
and Christopher Heath Wellman consider it to be so obvious that international tri-
bunals are permissible when a state has no legitimate sovereign interest in barring 
them that they do not extensively argue for the position. Once the veil of  sovereignty 
of  a state is rightly overcome, penal intervention against the criminally culpable for 
the sake of  protecting rights is permissible.52 Otherwise said, the major obstacle to 
51 Chehtman, supra note 43.
52 A. Altman and C.H. Wellman, A Liberal Theory of  International Justice (2009), at 69–95.
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international criminal law is understood by them to be the legitimate prerogatives of  
state institutions.
Lastly, the theorists I mention at the start are not, in my view, spinning their wheels 
to no theoretical effect. There is much to learn from their substantive points. Davidovic 
and Song may be quite right that international tribunals are implicated in a desira-
ble form of  the international rule of  law. May’s contention about boundary crossing 
could, in some circumstances, generate a special concern on the part of  the interna-
tional order. And the heinousness of  many international crimes can call for response 
(that is, the criminal liability of  offenders may itself  give rise to active reasons to 
respond, especially if  ‘positive’ retributivists or expressivists are at all right). Yet these 
are considerations that must compete with other considerations, like a legitimate state 
interest in achieving local peace, in any particular circumstance. Moreover, the con-
siderations will vary in applicability and strength – in some cases, for instance, bound-
ary crossings may not be at issue, or the heinousness may not be particularly great. 
In fact, universal jurisdiction, as we can see now, could obtain without any of  these 
theorists’ considerations being at issue. None of  these considerations, then, are prop-
erly thought of  as a foundation or special ground for universal jurisdiction. Rather, 
they are the sorts of  matters that can typically compete with the normal, legitimate 
prerogatives of  a state. In our thinking about criminal jurisdiction, they should be 
treated as such.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that much theory concerning universal jurisdiction inadequately dis-
tinguishes criminal liability from state prerogatives to prosecute and mistakenly 
assumes a need for a special ground or relationship to establish such jurisdiction. The 
argument proceeds by considering what criminal liability consists in and indicating 
its tight connection to substantive justifications of  punishment. This shows us that a 
court’s standing with respect to an offender is a feature of  its ability to respond to the 
reasons for criminal liability, though its standing with respect to other courts might 
bar a jurisdictional claim. For Court X to claim universal jurisdiction over a crime, 
then, is to claim a capacity to respond to some substantial reasons for criminal lia-
bility and to claim that no other institution has a prerogative (or a prerogative strong 
enough to challenge the importance of  Court X’s penal response). Moreover, we have 
good reason to think that significant reasons of  criminal liability are relationship inde-
pendent, even for ordinary crimes. An important upshot is that a large part of  our 
jurisdiction-related conversation in criminal law theory ought to be focused on the 
various legitimate aims and interests of  states and other international institutions.
More broadly, I hope to have loosened the grip of  what, at the start, I called the stand-
ard picture of  authority. The attraction of  the idea that penal authority is grounded 
on a tie between a tribunal and offender is, I suggest, a function of  both a sense that 
some reasons for criminal liability are relational in character and the notion that 
sometimes we will need to appeal to powerful considerations to overcome operative 
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state prerogatives (for example, that a crime is heinous or likely to negatively affect the 
international order). As we can now see, however, neither of  these two ideas is appro-
priate for characterizing the general nature of  the authority to punish. The alternative 
account offered here, which articulates the right to punish as a capacity to respond to 
the reasons for punishment, accommodates these two (likely sound) points and per-
mits us to account for the plurality of  our legitimate penal practices.53 According to 
my view, appeal to special relationships operates at a different level than a general the-
ory of  how to establish a right to punish. Such appeals indicate substantive matters 
pertaining to the content of  our reasons, not formal characterizations of  the nature 
of  tribunal authority. The analysis of  universal jurisdiction shows us, moreover, that 
having a correct model is important for theoretical purposes – again, it identifies the 
types of  questions we should ask at the various points in our justificatory undertaking 
(and, conversely, which ones we should not). We learn, for instance, that a quest for a 
foundation of  universal jurisdiction is likely misguided.
53 And, strictly speaking, can hold even if  all reasons for criminal liability are relationship dependent.
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